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1.  Introduction
In a series  of  recent papers, Neary  and  otters  have  established
the  importance of  trade  in  factor services, especially capital, in
determining  the  welfare  effects  of import  restrictions  by tariffs,  QRs, and
VERs.  1/  In the  absence of induced  terms-of-trade  changes  and  rental  rate
effects,  Neary  (1988) demonstrates that international  capital  mobility
raises  the  costs  of tariff  protection  and  lowers  that  of  QRs  and  VERs.  In
this  paper,  we  examine more  systematically  the  impact  of international
capital  mobility  on the welfare effects of  import  protection  by tariff,
QRs,  and  VERs.  Generalizing  the  work  of Neary  and  others  to take  explicit
account  of induced  terms-of-trade  and  rental  rate  effects,  we demonstrate
that  the  qualitative influence of  capital mobility on  the  costs  of
protection cannot be  ascertained  unambiguously.  This  reveals the
importance,  emphasized by  Dixit  (1987) among  others, of deciding  this
question  on empirical grounds.  We  then  simulate  the  aggregate  welfare
effects  of import  restraints  for  the  U.S.  under  different  assumptions  about
international  capital  mobility,  and  the  influence of the  size  of the  U.S.
in  world  markets.
The  paper  is  organized as  followst  Section 2  sets up an
analytical  model  that  indicates the  general links  between  international
capital  mobility  and  the welfare effects of  different forms  of import
restraint.  Section 3  reports  on  the  estimated welfare impact of
international  capital mobility on  the welfare effects of  U.S.  import
protection.  Conclusions  follow  in  section  4.2
2.  Qualitative  Analysis  of Import  Restraints
We develop a  general trade model  to  analyze the  qualitative
effects of  alternative forms of  protection with  and  without  capital
mobility. The  purpose  is to show  how the  welfare  costs  of  various  forms  of
protection  are  affected by  international  capital mobility in a general
model  with terms  of  trade  and  rental effects.  To this  end,  consider  an
economy where  tradables are  produced by  atomistic firms  in  perfect
competition,  demand  and  supply  functions  are  continuous and
differentiable,  and trade  policy  changes  do  not affect  the  pattern  of trade
specialization.  2/
Preferences  for  a  representative  consumer are  summarized  by an
expenditure  function:
e(p,u)  =  Y  (2.1)
where  p is  a vector  of  domestic prices and  u is  a  well-behaved  utility
function. Domestic  income,  Y, is  then given  by  GDP  plus  tariff  revenue,
net of  expatriated  rentals,  i.e.
Y  =  g(p, 1 + k)  +  (1-9) t-AM - rk - b  (2.2'
where  g is  the  continuously  differentiable  GDP  function,  M and  t  are
vectors  of imports  and  tariffs,  r  is  a diagonal  matrix  of  world  prices  for
imports,  b is  an  exogenous net  transfer unrelated  to trade  restrictions,
and  r is the  rental  rate. Tariff  rates,  t, are  exogenous  policy  parameters
when  imports  are  not  constrained,  but  when  imports are  constrained,  t
represents the  endogenous premium  rate on  the  constrained  imports. The3
parameter  0  < O <  1  measures  the  share  of  revenues (rents) accruing to
foreigners.  For simplicity,  assume that  the  share is zero  for  tariffs
and  QRs,  unity  for  VERs.  By choice  of  units, the  exogenously  fixed  stock
of domestically-owned  capital  is  set  equal  to  unity,  and  the  foreign-owned
capital  stock,  net  of domestic capital ownership  abroad,  used in  domestic
production  is  denoted  by k.  Using  standard  duality  theory,  the  equilibrium
rental  rate  and  import  levels  rental  rate  are  given  by:
r - gk  (p,  1 + k)  (2.3)
and
H - ep(p,u)  - gp  (p,  1 +  k)  (2.4)
where  lower  case  subscripts  denote  partial  differentiation.  To c  in  the
welfare  effects  of  a  change in  trade policy, equate  (2.1)  and (2.2),
totally  differentiate  and  substitute (2.3).  In  the  remainder  of the
discussion,  we assume  there  are  no  transfers  unrelated  to  trade  restrict-
ions,  i.e.,  db  =  0.  Then, the  resulting expression for  the  change  in
welfare,  dy  - eu(p,u)du,  which  is  the  change  in aggregate  utility  measured
in  numeraire  units,  is given  by:
dy - (1-@)  t'dm  - GM'dt  - H'(I-(l-0)t]  dir  - kdr  (2.5)
where  a  prime  denotes a  transpose, I is  the  identity matrix, a caret
denotes  a diagonal  matrix,  distorted  domestic  prices  have  been  expressed  in
terms  of  tariffs  --  world  prices  (dp  =  dir  +  dt),  and  world  prices  have4
been set  equal  to  unity.  The  first two terms  of (2.5)  indicate  that,  in
the  presence  of  a  distortion, any  increase in  imports  will be  welfare
improving.  However, the  third  terA measures  -he welfare  loss  from
purchasing  imports  at rising  world  prices.  Note that  the increasing  cost
of imports  is itself offset by  rising  domestic  tariff  revenues  (provided
that  0 <  1).  In  the  case  of  immobile  capital,  the  last  term  denotes  the
effect  of changing  endogenous rents  on  income  repatriated  to foreigners.
On the  other  hand,  when  capital is internationally  mobile,  we will assume
perfect  capital  mobility  (i.e.  dr-0)  and  k endogenous.
To evaluate  the role  of capital mobility  on the  effects  of import
protection,  consider  first  the  case  of  protection  by tariffs  (i.e.,  9=0).
With immobile  capital,  the  welfare  change  induced  by a tari^f  is then  given
by:
dy  - t'dM'-  M'(I-t)r  mdH - kdr  (2.6)
where  wm denotes  a  jacobian matrix  of  terms-of-trade  effects  induced  by
trade  flows. In the  case  of  a  tariff  and immobile  capital  both dr  and dM
are  endogenous  and  can  be obtained  from  (2.3)  and (2.4),  respectively. The
change  in  the rental  rate  is  given  by:
dr  =  gkpdp  +  gkkdk
=  gkpdt  +  gkplmdM  (2.7)
and the  change  in imports  by
dM  - eppdp  + epudu  - gppdp  - gpkdk
- -(gpp  - epp)dp  +  epudu
- -Sdt  - SrmdM  +  xydy
=  -(I+SWm)-l  [Sdt  - xydyJ  (2.8)S
In equ-l±brium,  the  change in  imports is  inversely  related  to the  price
response  of  excess domestic 3upply (the first  term  in  brackets),  and
negatively  related  to the  income-induced  change in  demand,  xydy,  where  xy
denotes  the  income  elasticity  of demand  in  numeraire  units.
Combining  expressions  (2.6),  (2.7),  and  (2.8)  leads  to a reduced-
form  for  the  aggregate  welfare  effect  of  a tariff  when capital  is immobile,
i.e.,
dy  - -(1 - axy)-l  (a'S  +  kgkp)dt  (2.9)
with  net tariff  income  effect
a'  =  {t'  - tM'(I  - t)  +  kgkp]rm}  (I  +  Sf)r  (2.10)
The  last  expression  indicates  how  induced  terms-of-trade  effects  may offset
distortionary  welfare  costs. .ne  influence of rental  rate  changes,  kgkp  -
krp,  depends  upon  the  overall capital intensity of tradables  and  cannot
generally  be signed.
Consider  now  the  case when  capital is internationally  mobile.
Then  expression  (2.7)  takes  the  form
dr - gkpdp +  gkkdk - 0  (2.11)
and  substituting  for  dk from  (2.11)  into  (2.8)  yields
dH4=  (g  8 -k 8 -k e  ~)dp  +x  d
PP  gpkgkk  gkp  ~  pp)d  + x 
- - Sdt  - SrmdH  +  x  ydy6
^  .-  (I  +  mSr)  ESdt  - x  ydy  (2.12)
using  a tilde  to  denote a  corresponding  expression  under  international
capital  mobility. We  now  have  the  following  expression  for  the  welfare
effect  of a tariff  change:
dy - - (1 - a'x )  a'Sdt  (2.13)
y
where
a'  - (t'  - M'(I-t)r  m} (I  +  Sirm)  (2.14)
Direct  comparison  of expressions  (2.9)  and (2.13)  yields  no general  conclu-
sions. Neary (1988)  and  others  have  observed  that ISI  >  ISI  because  of the
Le Chatelier  Principle  and  the  Envelope Theorem.  Access  to competitive
international  capital markets  (i.e., assuming that  r  is fixed)  raises
domestic  supply  elasticities,  increasing the  quantity  response  to  normal
trade  distortions.  This drives the  economy farther from  free  trade.
However,  we show  that  this  effect will  be offset  by induced  terms-of-trade
and  rental  rate changes.  The  relative importance of each  effect  will
depend  upon the  factor  intensities  of  all  tradable  goods,  and  on the  size
of  the  economy in world markets. Assuming  away  terms  of trade  effects,
i.e.  a'  - a' =  t',  the  difference between  tariff-induced  welfare  effects,
with and  without  capital  mobility,  becomes
dy  -dy  = (1  -t'xy) 1 tt'S  - S) - kgkpJ  dt
=(-tx  1-ttg  y  kgkp  dt  (2.15)7
The  sign  of the  first  term  in  bracketi is  positive,  since  gkk  1 <  0, but
the  second  term  is still indeterminate.  Neary  and  Ruane  (1983,  p. 576)
assume  that  gkp  - 0, -'-ile  Neary  (1988, fn.  p.  729)  assumes  k - 0.  The
significance  of foreigi-owned  capital and  of the  protection-induced  change
in the  value  of payments  to  foreign  owners  of  capital  i-  an issue  that  must
be settled  on  empirical grounds. 3/  The  results above  emphasize  the
importance  of estimating  these  effects in  countries with  high levels  of
foreign  investment.
The  role of  terms-of-trade effects  is  more  complex, but
nonetheless  intuitive.  These will  partially or  completely  offset  the
distortionary  costs  of  tariffs, leading in  the  latter case  ro  welfare
gains. If  we omit  rental  rate  effects,  however,  then
dy - dy =  -f(i)'S +  f(a)'S  (2.1.6)
where  fa >  0.  Since  S >  S,  then  a >  a  would  mean that  capital  mobility
increases  the  welfare  effects  (cost or  benefit)  of tariffs,  as implied  by
Neary's  results. A sufficient  condition for  this  case  to  obtain  would  be
that  tradables  have  no cross  terms-of-trade  effects  (rm  is  diagonal  and  all
nonzero  eleLlents  are  negative).  However,  empirical  results  below  suggest
that  cross  terms-of-trade  effects  are  not  likely  to  be negligible,  at least
for  the  U.S.
Turn  now  to the  welfare effect of  a  quota  on imports  (9  =  0).
Under  competitive  conditions,  one  can  establish  a first-order  equivalence
with a tariff  since:
dy = (t'  - tM'(I  - t) +  kgkp]r } aM  (2.17)8
when capital  is immobile  and
dy - It'  - H'(I-  t)r I  dH  (2.18)
when  capital  is internationally  mobile. Since  dH is exogenous,  there  is  no
first-order  role  for  irternationally  mcile  capital,  and  the  difference
dy - dy  - kgkpWmdM depends upon domestic rental rate  adjustments  anid
induced  terms-of-trade  effects.
Second-order  quota  effects  do admit  a role for  capital mobility.
To  evaluate  these,  expand  the  Taylor  series
dy - y  dM  +  1/2  dM'y  mdM  (2.19)
where  Ym is  obtained  from  (2.17) and  (2.18) and  ymm  - tm - B, represents
the  role  of first-order  domestic price  (now endogenous  import  premia  t)
adjustments,  tm,  and  B, the  second-order  terms-of-trade  effects. We assume
the  latter  to  be negligible  and  solve for  the  former  in  each  case. When
capital  is immobile,  tm  is  obtained by  substituting  the  exogenous  quota
adjustment  dH from (2.8)  into  (2.6),  and  algebraic  manipulation  yields
tm  =  y  (S  +  xykgkp)  t± xy [t'  -M' (I  - mt)rm}  - 7m
Pm  m  (2.20)
The  corresponaing  expression  for  mobilb  capital  is obtained  from  (2.6)  and
(2.12)  as
t  '-S  {I  - x  t' - H'(I - o]  1  vm m  y  in  m
Pm  1 sm  (2.21)
and  the  difference  in  price  effects  due  to  capital  mobility  can  be repre-
sented  by the  determinant9
Itm :tmI  -p
(2.22)
- - ItS 1  (S  +  xykgkp)  H  *I  - xKt)? - Ml (I - t)rm3)1
Again,  the  result depends upoII  the  relative factor intensity of  all
tradables  and induced  terms-of-trade  effects.  As Neary (1988)  and  Neary
and  Ruane  (1988)  emphasize,  the  first  term in  brickets  above  is  negative
because  of  Le Chatelier  effects.  As  was argued  intuitively  above,  access
to competitive international  capital markets increases domestic  supply
elasticities,  thus  reducing  required  price  adjustments  to exogenously  fixed
quantity  adjustmex.cs.  In  Neary  and  Ruane  (1988)  and  Neary  (1988),  kgkp  - 0
and  1m - 0,  so  the  first determinant  above  is  negative,  the  second  is
unity.  Ignoring only  terms-of-trade  effects, purely  capital-intensive
tradables  would  magnify  the  effect Neary  predicts  (capital  mobility  lowers
the  cost  of quotas), while  labor-intensive  tradables  would  counteract  it.
The  same  argument  applies  when  1m is  nonzero. Thus,  in general,  expression
(2.22)  cannot  be reliably  signed, and  recourse  to empirical  estimation  is
necessary.
When imports  are  subject  to VER  restraints,  the  cost  of protection
with immobile  capital  is (0  - 1).
dy  M'dt - M'dr - kdr
- M'dp - kgkpdr
- - (H'pm  +  kgkpvm)dH  (2.23)
while its  mobile  capital  counterpart  is10
dy - :M'pmdM  (2.24)
and  capital  mobility  plays  a  more  direct,  but  equally  inconclusive,  role.
Assuming  away  terms-of-trade  and  rental  effects,  one  obtains  Neary's  (1988)
result  that  (2.23)  is  negative and  that  the welfare  effects  of VERs  are
reduced  because  of capital  mobility. Again,  this  is  an issue  to  be settled
empirically.
We  have  shown that terms-of-trade  and  rental rate  valuation
effects are  sufficient to  prevent one  from  signing the  effects of
1..ternational  capital  mobility  on  the welfare costs  of tariffs,  QRs,  and
VERs.  Terms-of-trade  and  rental  effects are  unlikely  to be negligible,  at
least for  a  number of  industrialized  countries which  have  sizeable
worldwide  market shares.  Thus we  examine further the  issue with a
numerical application  to  the  U.S.  economy, evaluating the  costs  of
protection  with and  without  capital  mobility  for  the  year  1984.
3.  An  Application  to  the  Welfare  Effects  of U.S.  Import  Restrictions
This section  evaluates  the  aggregate welfare  costs  to the  U.S. of
QRs  in autos,  textiles  and  steel and  of tariffs,  using  a static  six-sector
computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model.  4/  The  model  is  calibrated  to
1984  data  and  is  more  thoroughly discussed in  the  appendix. Two  forms  of
trade  restriction  are  modelled:  tariff protection  with tax  collection
returned to  the  representative consumer;  and  QR  protection.  Two
assumptions  are  made with  respect to  factor mobility:  (1)  no capital
mobility,  in  which  case  capital  owned  by domestic  and  foreign  residents  are15
the  welfare  costs  of  protection  would  be eliminated  if the  US could  capture
the  premia  by,  for  example,  auctioning  import  licenses  to importers.
Consider now  the  effects of  induced terms-of-trade  changes,
looking  first  at the  results  in  column 1 for  immobile  capital. An optimal
level  of QR (or  tariff) protection can,  in  the  absence  of retaliation,
improve  national  welfare. For  the  midsize economy,  the  optimal  level  of
protection  will be lower  than  for  the  large  economy,  but  as is indicated  by
the  estimates  of the  distortionary  costs of  QRs, it is still  higher  than
the  level  of protection  prevailing in  1984.  Thus  the  distortionary  costs
of  QRs  are  cut in half  for  the  midsize  economy  case  and  become  negative
only  in the  large economy case.  Observe now  that  the  estimate  of the
premium  component  cost of  VERs  is  largely unaffected  by terms-of-trade
changes. The reason  is that we  have  assumed  the  same  degree  of  monopoly
and  monopsony  power  in  exports and  imports.  Hence  the  terms-of-trade
losses  in  expenditures  on  imports are  compensated  by terms-of-trade  gains
on a lower  volume  of  exports.  Note  also  that,  for  the  midsize  economy
case,  the  U.S.  would  be likely to  see  its  welfare  reduced  by a  unilateral
tariff  reduction. Of  course, more detailed  econometric  evidence  on export
demand  and  import  supply  elasticities  would  be  necessary  to  have  confidence
in  this  result,  but  it  is  nonetheless suggestive  of the  dilemma  facing  a
large  country  when it  contemplates  a  unilateral  reduction  in  protection.
Note  from the  discussion of  expression (2.15) that  the  Le
Chatelier  effect  influences costs  and  benefits symmetrically. Now the
induced  terms-of-trade  reverse  the  welfare effects  of tariffs,  but capital
mobility  reduces  the  magnitude  of the  loss  from  tariff  liberalization  as it16
does  the  gain  under  fixed  world  prices.  The  effects  on premia  capture  and
full  liberalization  are  also  reversed.
The  large  economy  variant  gives  a  more  extreme  example  of terms-
of-trade  effects. Now  the  distortionary  costs of QRs  are  also  negative
because of  the  induced  terms-of-trade losses and  capital mobility
attenuates  losses  from  removing QRs  as  well  as the  losses  from  removing
tariffs.
To summarize,  although none  of  the  uniform  elasticity  scenarios
described  here  will correspond  exactly to  the  degree  of  U.S.  market  power
in the  world  economy,  it is  apparent  from  the  midsize  economy  results  that
induced  terms-of-trade  effects have  a  strong influence on the  welfare
effects  of protection,  and  particularly  on  the  role  of capital  mobility  in
determining  those  effects.  The  simulations  also pointed out  to the
quantitative  relevance  of  expatriated  rental  income  effects.
4.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  extended previous analytical  work on the  role  of
international  capital mobility in  determining  the  welfare effects  of
various  forms  of import  protection.  Taking  into  account  induced  terms-of-
trade  and  rental rate effects, we  showed that the  effect  of capital
mobility on  welfare  cannot  be  ascertained  qualitatively.  This
indeterminacy  led  us to  present  a  set  of empirical  results  obtained  from  a
CGE  model  of the  U.S.  These  results  confirm  the  importance  of terms-of-
trade  and rental  effects in  determining  the  ultimate  effects  of capital
mobility on  the welfare costs of  import restraints  for  an  economy
integrated into  the world  capital  markets.  The  simulations  also
illustrated  the  importance  of second-best  effects  in the  evaluation  of the
costs  of protection  when there  is international  capital  mobility.17
Foonotes
1/  See  for  example,  Neary  and  Ruane  (1988),  Neary  (1988).
2/  The  presentation  follows closely Neary  (1988). Wherever  possible,
our  notation  is the  same  as his.
3/  For  example,  in 1984  the  foreign-owned  share  of the  U.S.  net capital
stock  was 1.4Z  and  by 1988 this percent  had risen  six-fold. During
the same  period,  the  trade-weighted  U.S.  average  tariff  rate  was 3.4Z
on imports  representing  5.6Z  of gross  output.
4/  The  model  is an  extension  of the model  presented  in  de Melo  and  Tarr
(1990)  to include  capital  mobility.18
References
Brecher,  R. and  C.  Diaz-Alejandro,  1977,  "Tariffs, Foreign  Capital  and
Immiserizing  Growth"  Journal  of International  Economics,  7:317-22.
Dixit,  A. K.,  1987,  wStrategic  Aspects of  Trade  Policy,"  in Truman Bewley
(ed.), Advances in  Economic Theory:  Fifth World  Congress,
Econometric Society  Monographs,  Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Dixit,  A. K. and  V. Norman, 1980,  Theory  of International  Trade,  Cambridge
University  Press,  Cambridge.
Elliot,  K.,  J.  Schott  and  W.  Takacs, 1987,  Auction  Quotas  and  U.S.  Trade
Policy,  Institute  for  International  Economics,  Washington,  D.C.
Jones,  R., 1967,  "International  capital  movements  and  the  theory  of tariffs
and trade,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  81, 1-38.
Jones,  R., 1984,  "Protection  and  the  Harmful  Effects  of  Endogenous  Capital
Flows,"  Economic  Letters,  15,  325-30.
Melo,  J. de and  D. Tarr, 1990,  "Welfare  Costs  of  U.S.  Quotas  in Textiles,
Steel  and  Autos"  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,
Melo,  J. de and  D.  Roland-Holst,  1989,  "Structural  Adjustment  to  Import
Restrictions  When Factor Services are  Tradable,"  paper  presented
to the  N.B.E.R.  workshop on  Applied  General  Equilibrium  Analyses,
San  Diego,  Septemb0r.
Melo,  J. de  and  S.  Robinson, 1986,  "Product Differentiation  and  Trade
Dependence  of  the  Domestic Price System in  Computable  General
Equilibrium  Trade  Models"  in  T. Peeters  et al.  eds.,  International
Trade  and  Exchange Rates  in  the  Late Eighties,  North  Holland,
Amsterdam.
Neary,  J. P.,  1985,  "International  Factor  Mobility,  Minimum  Wage  Rates  and
Factor  Price  Equalization:  A  Synthesis,"  Quarterly  Journal  of
Economics,  100,  551-70.
Neary,  J. P.,  1988,  wTariffs, quotas,  and  voluntary  export  restraints  with
and  without  internationally  mobile capital,"  Canadian  Journal  of
Economics,  11,  714-735.
Neary,  J. P. and  F.  Ruane, 1988,  "International  Capital  Mobility,  Shadow
Prices, and  the  Cost  of  Protection,"  International  Economic
Review.19
Appendix
This  appendix  describes  the  structure and  functional  forms  of the
model  used  for  the  simulations  reported in section  3 and  the  benchmarking
to 1984  US data.
Al.  Model  Outline
Table  Al presents  the  structure  and functional  forms  of the  static
six-sector  model  used  for  the  simulations.  To  save  on  notation,  a one-
sector  version  of  the  model  is  presented here.  This  helps  focus  the
presentation  on the  treatment of  different forms of  protection  and  on
assumptions  about  capital  mobility. As  in section  2, the  model  aggregates
all  components  of final  demand into consumption  demand  and  the  government
sector returns all  tax  revenue  (entirely  due  to  tariffs) to  the
representative  consumer. Hence,  the  economy  only  has  trade  distortions  so
that  changes  in  welfare are  entirely accounted for  by changes  in trade
policy  under  each  one  of the  model  closures. Production  takes  place  under
perfect  competition.
The  welfare  measure is  the  expenditure  function  associated  with
the  LES  utility  function  (eq.  A.1)  from  which  are  derived  labor  supply,  L,
(eq.  A.4)  and  composite  consumption  expenditures,  C, (eq.  A.9).  Technology
is described by  CES  functions for  value-added (eq. A.2)  and  Leontief
functions  between  intermediates  (as  a  whole) and  value-added,  as  well as
within  intermediates  (eq.  A.3).  However, within  each  sector,  demand  is a
CES  function  between  domestically  and  foreign-produced  goods  (eqs.  A.7 and
A.8).  Thus,  the  same elasticity of  substitution  between  domestic  and
imported  goods  is assumed  by end-use. Finally,  export  supply  is  given  by a20
CET  function (eqs. A.11  and  A.12).  The  assumption of  product
differentiation  on the  export  side  and  on  the import  side  rules  out  trade
specialization  in response  to changes  in trade  policy.
A2.  Benchmarking  to 1984
Table  A2 shows  that  the  three  sectors  subject  to import  restraints
are  import-competing  (low export-to-supply  ratios and  relatively  high
import-supply  ratios) whereas the  other two  traded sectors export  a
substantial  share  of domestic production.  This  has implications  for  the
resource pulls  of  trade  policy  changes  in  a  model  with  product
differentiation.  In  particular,  an increase  in  protection  in the "primary"
or "other  tradable"  sectors  will  have,  other  things  being  equal,  a smaller
effect  on resource  pulls  because  of  the  possibility  to divert  export  sales
to the  domestic  market.
Ad valorem  tariff  rates  appear  in  column 7.  Note that  these  are
applied  on the  premium-inclusive  price  of  imports.  The  premium  rate  for
textiles  and  vehicles  is given  in  column 7.  As explained  in de  Melo  and
Tarr (1989,  chp.  4),  these premia rates  are  conservative  estimates  of the
premia  due  to quantitative  restrictions  in  those sectors. The last  four
columns  give  the  values assumed for  the  various  elasticities  describing
demand  and supply  response.
Though  not indicated  in  the  table,  the  model  was  calibrated  to the
(exogenous)  current  account  deficit  of $104  billion  in  1984. Finally,  note
that  because  the  model  is  calibrated to  1984,  there  is  no premium  rate  on
steel  imports. As  discussed in  the  text,  rationing  steel  imports  gives
rise  to a 72  premium  on steel  imports.21
Table Al:  A  ONE SECTOR CGE MODEL
Expenditure Function (EXP)
EXP - LES (P,Y)  (A.1)
Technology
V X - MIN {  ,  CES (L,  K, ap)}  (A.2)
A  ~~~~p 
V  - AX  (A.3)
Factor Supplies
L u LS  (A.4)
K  =  KD +  KM  (A.5)
Factor Demands
L/K =  CESn (r/w)  P  (A.6)
Domestic Demand and Allocation of Traded Goods
Q  =  CES (D,  H; Om)  (A.7)
D/M - CESm (PMV/PD)Um  (A.8)
C - LES (Q,  Y)  (A.9)
D =  VD +  CD; M =  CM +  VM  (A.10)
Xs =  CET (D,  E; Oe)  (A.l1)
DIE - CETe (PD/PE)  e  (A.12)
Domestic Goods Market Equilibrium
X3 - D  (A.13)22
Table Al (continued)
Income and Government Revenue
Y - WL + rKD + GR - b*ER  + (1-6) (X  *  H  PH)  ER  (A.14)
GR - r  *  H * t * ER  (A.15)
Trade Balance Constraint
r  (H  - E) - b - rM-  H  *  H  PH)  ER  (A.16)
Foreign-Traded Goods Prices
PE - i *  ER  (A.17)
PH  - r  (1  + t) ER  (A.18)
Foreign-Traded Goods Supplies
H-  Wfes(A.19)
E ,  -ed  (A.20)
Determination of Premia Rates
H < H* 4  X  > 0  PMV - PH (1  + X)  (A.21)
H - M* 4  X - 0; PMV - PH
Numeraire
PD _ 1  (A.22)23
Table  Al  (continuod)
Variables  Definition  of  Variables  and Pareeaters
X  Domstic  output
L  Labor use
K  Capital  use
V  Int.rmediate  use (domestic and Imported)
VV  Imported  Inte rodate goods
VD  Dom_stic Interomdiate  goods
Cm  Imported consumption  goods
CD  Domestic consumption  goodo
E  Exports
D  Domestic goods for  domeetic use
Y  Aggregate  dometie  lncome
OR  Total  tariff  revenue
r  Rental  rate
L  Labor supply
KM  Ipoorted  capital
t  Ipoort  tariff  rate
PM  Domestic currencies  price  of  Imported conswuor  and intermediate goods
PV  CR-ridden price  of  conswoer  and Intermdiate  goodo
PE  Domestic  currency  price  of  exported  goods
ER  Exchange  rate  (in  terms of  numorair.)
Paramoters  and  Exogenous  Variables
b  Balance  of  trade
KD Li  Domestic  capital;  labor  supply
a  Input-output  coofficient
are,  Uon  > 0  Compensated  price  elasticitioe  of  export  supply  and  iport  demand
ap > 0  Capital  labor  *1i6stitution
)  >  0  Premium  rate  when  ts  binoding
t  >  0  Import  tariff
es > 0  Import Supply Elasticity
ed  >  F  foreign  Export  Demand  Elasticity
e  a  By cholco  of unite.  Foreign  currency  price  (in term_  of
numeralro)Table  A2:  SUMMARY  STRUCTURE  OF THE 1984  U.S. ECONOMY
X  D  U  E  L  K  to  or,  2  3  E
4/
Column  1  2  3  4  S  6  7  8  9  10  11  12
Primary  482.317  449.877  64.378  32.440  427.s00  2449.931  .006  .000  .60  1.42  3.90  .34
Textiles  122.804  116.044  23.623  6.760  196.900  64.448  .177  .405  1.00  2.68  2.90  1.30
Vehicle  124.203  119.343  32.616  4.860  53.646  292.498  .027  .318  .81  2.01  2.90  1.00
Steel  67.608  E6.148  12.706  1.380  53.100  236.517  .063  .000  1.00  3.05  2.90  1.00
Other  Tradable  4018.182 3780.602  269.996  237.680  6000.264  16260.987  .029  .000  .80  .40  2.90  .70
Non-traded  Services  2443.322 2443.322  .000  .000  3768.900  14037.896  .000  .000  .80  3.15  2.90  1.45
Totals  7248.336  6965.336  403.319  283.000  10500.699  32322.277
Note:  All values  in  columns  1 to  6  are  in  1984  3  billion. For a definition  of  variables,  see Table  Al.
/  Elasticity  of  substitution  in  production.
?/  Compensated  price  elasticity  of  import  demand.
3/  Compensated  prico  eloaticity  of  export  supply.
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